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The expansion of coastal marine protected areas can suffer from two key draw-
backs: (a) the difficulty of incentivizing local communities to manage areas for
conservation when their livelihoods also depend on resource use; and (b) that
many protected areas get situated residually, or in locations with limited value
for either biodiversity conservation or livelihoods. Here, we discuss and analyze
key characteristics of Tonga’s SpecialManagement Area (SMA) program, includ-
ing both the mechanisms that have motivated its successful national expan-
sion and its ability to configure no-take reserves in areas that are considered
to have high value to resource users. Granting communities exclusive access
zones in exchange for implementing no-take reserves has encouraged conserva-
tion actionswhile fostering long-term relationships with resources. Ensuring no-
take reserves occurred within the boundaries of exclusive access zones enabled
communities to protect areas of greater extractive values than they would have
otherwise. We conclude that the success of this program offers a way forward for
achieving targets in the global expansion marine protected areas.
KEYWORDS
community-based management, conservation, marine protected areas, residual conservation,
South Pacific, TURF
1 INTRODUCTION
Food security and biodiversity are increasingly threatened
by the depletion or collapse of marine resources (Díaz
et al., 2019), and many proposed management strategies
fail at scaling up to achieve meaningful national or inter-
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national conservation results (Mills et al., 2019). Marine
resources are also notorious for suffering from the “tragedy
of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), whereby individuals or
groups of individuals overexploit a resource and behave
contrary to the common good of all users (Ostrom, 1999).
While many marine management strategies have been
Conservation Letters. 2020;13:e12742. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/conl 1 of 10
https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12742
2 of 10 SMALLHORN-WEST et al.
implemented, each comes with its own suite of caveats
(Ban et al., 2011; Jupiter, Cohen, Weeks, Tawake, & Govan,
2014). A key goal of conservation policy and management
research is to identify solutions to the specific issues that
limit the effectiveness of various management strategies
(Diaz et al. 2019).
Protected areas are expanding globally as a key manage-
ment strategy to address both declining food security and
biodiversity (Diaz et al., 2019;Mills et al., 2019).While their
management often takes the form of centralized govern-
ments gazetting areas for conservation, in practice, they are
often compromised by a lack of resources for monitoring
and enforcement (Gaymer et al., 2014). In response to con-
tinuing fisheries declines despite centralizedmanagement,
governments of many developing countries are increas-
ingly focusing on decentralized, community-based, or co-
management approaches, which in many instances were
already in place through customarymarine tenure (Cinner
et al., 2012; Govan et al., 2009; Webster et al., 2017). Here,
we consider community-based management to be natu-
ral resource or biodiversity management by, for, and with
the local community (as defined by Western & Wright,
1994) and co-management as situations where communi-
ties share responsibilities formaking and enforcing natural
resource management rules with governments, civil soci-
ety, and/or academia (Cinner and Huchery, 2014).
Implementing protected areas is often met with resis-
tance unless local communities can be offered incentives
to manage areas for conservation when their livelihoods
depend on the resources within them (Brockington &
Schmidt-Soltau, 2017; Ferraro & Hanauer, 2011). Typically,
managers and conservationists argue that the long-term
food security of an area and its biodiversity value outweigh
immediate requirements for continued resource use (Hut-
ton&Leader-Williams, 2014). However, offering long-term
assurances of increased food security and ecosystemhealth
might not always be important for people forwhom finding
food ormaking a living are immediate concerns (Hutton &
Leader-Williams, 2014). The strategy of excluding resource
extraction has attracted criticism from social scientists and
human rights advocates for resulting in the forced dis-
placement of populations and loss of food security (Cernea
& Schmidt-Soltau, 2006). While compensatory incentive-
based programs do exist, such as direct payment conces-
sions for protected areas, they likely provide limited bene-
fits to biodiversity conservation unless they are conditional
on defined conservation actions (Mills et al., 2019; Sached-
ina & Nelson, 2009).
A second problem with the global expansion of pro-
tected areas is that many are residual, defined as being sit-
uated in locations with limited value for extractive activi-
ties, and have correspondingly small conservation impact
(Devillers et al., 2015; Ferraro & Hanauer, 2011; Joppa &
Pfaff, 2011). Ultimately, protected areas are effective only
if they change human behavior (Pressey, Weeks, & Gur-
ney, 2017). Therefore, to achieve impact they must be
configured to influence either present day or potential
future actions (Smallhorn-West, Bridge, Malimali, Pressey,
& Jones, 2019). However, given the importance of involv-
ing local stakeholders in the planning process (Hutton &
Leader-williams, 2014), it seems inevitable that resource
users will aim to configure protected areas to minimize
overlap with their current or planned activities.
The responsibility of identifying solutions to incentivize
protected area implementation and ensure they are situ-
ated to achieve impact should lie with planners as well as
conservation policy andmanagement researchers. Individ-
ual communities may have little choice but to prioritize
their immediate needs for food and/or income. The ques-
tion raised is therefore: “Is it possible to align the require-
ments of communities with the goal of building sustain-
able use and biodiversity conservation into the future?”
Here, we address this question by discussing the recent
rapid expansion and successful implementation of Tonga’s
co-management initiative, the Special Management Areas
(SMA) program, at a national level. We use this program
as a case study to identify solutions to the aforementioned
problems of providing community incentives for conserva-
tion, and ensuring conservation actions are non-residual.
In a relatively short time (15 years), Tonga’s SMA program
has expanded from a few communities to over 50, covering
roughly half of all coastal communities in the country and
aiming to include 100% by 2025. Furthermore, SMAs are
situated in places that are considered to have high value
for resource users. We argue that, by providing the right
balance of incentives, the SMA program has successfully
avoided key pitfalls associated with protected area imple-
mentation, which has enabled the program to expand to
a national level in a way that is non-residual. Specifically,
we: (a) describe the background and key characteristics of
the program; (b) identify mechanisms by which the pro-
gramhas avoided problems that have constrained the effec-
tiveness of other protected areas, including (i) provisioning
of appropriate incentives and (ii) avoiding conserving only
residual areas; and (c) discuss potential limitations of the
program and its expansion to other regions. We conclude
that the success of this program offers insights into the suc-
cessful expansion of protected areas globally.
2 BACKGROUND OF TONGA’S
SPECIALMANAGEMENT AREA (SMA)
PROGRAM
Fisheries management in Tonga was historically open
access, with little to no effective regulations. A civil war in
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F IGURE 1 Map of a typical Special Management Area (SMA) in Tonga. The yellow denotes the SMA area, in which only members of the
community are allowed to fish, similar to a territorial user rights fishery (TURF). The red denotes the Fish Habitat Reserves (FHR), which are
permanently closed to all fishing. Given that this SMA included both exposed and sheltered fringing reefs, this particular community (Ha’atafu)
opted to implement two no-take FHRs instead of one
the mid-1800s resulted in the then king, King Taufa’ahau
Tupou I, abolishing all tenure—a key difference between
Tonga and many other Pacific island nations where cus-
tomarymarine tenure is in place. TheKing also proclaimed
that: (a) all Tongans had equal fishing access to all Ton-
gan waters; and (b) that any traditional claims of local
control or management authority over fishing areas were
abolished (Gillett, 2017). Inmodern times, this open-access
approach has collided with commercial realities and the
inability of inshore resources to sustain harvests (Gillett,
2017). Due to growing concern over the potential deple-
tion or collapse of marine resources, several forms of cen-
tralized management and protected areas were attempted
in the late 20th century (Smallhorn-West & Govan, 2018).
However, due to the limited capacity at the time of the
TonganMinistry of Fisheries (MoF), themain government
agency chargedwithmonitoring and enforcement, there is
no evidence that resource extractionwithin thesemanaged
areas ever changed.
In the early 2000s, growing support for the concept
of letting local communities manage their own resources
resulted in the Fisheries Management Act 2002 (Gillett,
2017). Funding was provided by Australia to support the
Tonga fisheries project and assist in the establishment
of the early SMAs. The first, O’ua in the Ha’apai group,
was designated in November 2006. While the program has
since received funding frommany sources (Gillett, 2017), it
has largely been the TonganMoF that has driven its expan-
sion. Tongans are therefore justifiably proud in the fact that
the successful implementation of this “home grown” pro-
gram has largely been due to the efforts of Tongans.
The SMAprogram is a dual approach tomarinemanage-
ment and conservation (Figure 1). First, through legislative
action, each community is granted exclusive access to the
marine environment adjacent to their village to the 50 m
depth contour or 2500 m from shore. Within this area only
registeredmembers of the community are permitted to fish
and it effectively acts as a territorial user rights fisheries
(TURF) (Gelcich, Godoy, Prado, & Castilla, 2008). The
role of enforcement is primarily that of the community,
with support and training provided by the MoF. Second,
in exchange for this exclusive access, a subset of the area
must be designated a permanent no-take zone, termed a
Fish Habitat Reserve (FHR). The size and location of each
FHR are determined by the community and, if desired,
communities may implement multiple FHRs. The size
and boundaries of each SMA are determined by the MoF
in consultation with both the SMA communities and adja-
cent communities. Within each SMA, management and
enforcement are the responsibility of the community, and
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F IGURE 2 Overview of Tonga’s Special Management Area program. Yellow denotes Special Management Areas (SMAs), red no-take Fish
Habitat Reserves (FHRs), and black communities. Top left: Map of Tonga in the South Pacific. Right: Map of all SMAs and FHRs as of October
2019. Bottom left: Growth of the SMA program, with bars indicating the total numbers of SMAs and FHRs and lines representing the total areas
each must establish a coastal community management
committee and a coastal community management plan.
Communities, therefore, take the leading role inmanaging
their coastal resources, although assistance is provided
by the Ministry as required. Tonga’s SMA program has
become so popular with Tongan communities that there
is more interest from communities than the capacity of
the MoF can currently manage (Gillett, 2017). During the
decade following the implementation of the first SMAs
(2006–2015), the program grew slowly, with 11 SMAs in
implemented (Figure 2; Table S1). The slow uptake was
largely due to the lengthy process of raising awareness and
educating communities and the public about the benefits
of marine management. However, as awareness grew,
interest in the program expanded exponentially. From
2016 to 2019, 31 new SMAs were established, resulting in
roughly half of all coastal communities in Tonga having
an SMA. This rapid uptake following 2016 was likely due
in part to (a) increased awareness from a “lessons learned”
conference in October 2015 implemented by the MoF
and Civil Society Forum of Tonga and supported by the
Marine and Coastal Biodiversity Management in Pacific
Island Countries (MACBIO) project (Tupou Taufa et al.,
2016), and, (b) increased financial support from various
international donors to implement new SMAs in the
Vava’u archipelago (e.g., Asian Development Bank and
WAITT Institute). As of September 2019, an additional 46
SMA communities have either been confirmed, submitted
to cabinet for approval, written a letter of interest, or
been proposed, with the aim of including all coastal
communities in the program by 2025 (Table S2).
3 MECHANISMS BYWHICH THE SMA
PROGRAMHAS AVOIDED PITFALLS
COMMON IN THE EXPANSION OF
PROTECTED AREAS ELSEWHERE
3.1 Providing community incentives for
conservation
The primary consideration ofmost communities for imple-
menting an SMA is to exclude others from fishing “their”
reefs (Figure 3a). Exclusive access rights are a substan-
tial asset for any community, and it is inherently in the
interest of each community to establish an SMA. How-
ever, given that in exchange for exclusive rights commu-
nities must also establish a no-take FHR, the SMA pro-
vides the incentive to achieve meaningful conservation
results through the FHR. Baseline socio-economic surveys
of seven new SMA communities in the Vava’u island group
demonstrated that there was strong support (>90%) for
the implementation of the SMA program, including the
FHRs, which provides evidence to suggest that this is the
case (Parks, 2017). The perceived effectiveness of manage-
ment efforts, including both SMAs and FHRs were also
very high, specifically as a way to improve livelihoods
(94% support), lead healthier lives (94% support), adapt to
climate change (91% support), improve marine resources
(94% support) and improve community ability to manage
marine resources (96% support) (Parks, 2017). Considering
the popularity of the program, the SMA incentive, there-
fore, appears to provide ample compensation to communi-
ties for giving up the fishing grounds within the FHRs.
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F IGURE 3 Conceptualization of Tonga’s Special Management Area (SMA) program. The top row represents the state prior to the imple-
mentation of the program including problems with open access systems and factors preventing successful conservation efforts. Themiddle row
represents the SMA program, with the expected outcomes of the SMAs and FHRs. The bottom three boxes represent key mechanisms by which
the SMA program has avoided problems that have constrained the effectiveness of other protected areas
Another mechanism by which community incentives
have driven the expansion of the SMA program is through
a positive feedback loop that increases pressure for remain-
ing non-SMA communities to apply (Figure 3b). While
SMA communities can fish both inside and outside their
SMAs, non-SMA communities are blocked from fishing
inside nearby SMAs. At the program’s inception, when
only a small number of SMAs were in place, this would
not have been of huge consequence to non-SMA commu-
nities. However, as the program has expanded, each addi-
tional SMA implemented has further reduced the fishing
grounds for non-SMA communities while leaving their
coastal areas vulnerable to fishing by all other communi-
ties. This increased loss of fishing grounds has therefore
created a positive feedback mechanism which increases
their incentive to establish an SMA.
As with TURF systems established elsewhere
(Villaseñor-Derbez et al., 2019), many communities
have also developed a sense of pride and ownership over
their SMAs and FHRs as well as the program as a whole,
and encouraged a sense of belonging and the development
of long-term connections with ‘their’ reefs. Within Tonga
these assertions are supported by (a) two socioeconomic
assessments of the effects of the SMA program that
demonstrate strong local support for the program within
SMA communities (Malimali, 2013; Parks, 2017) and (b)
statements from community members and fishers in
five SMA communities (personal communications). In
addition, Gillett (2017) suggests that the “home grown”
development of the SMA program by Tongans into its
current form has been critical to maintaining a local sense
of ownership and pride. These implications also align
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more broadly with the academic literature on support for
local management, particularly in the Indo-Pacific (e.g.,
Bartlett, Pakoa, & Manua, 2009; Johannes, 2002; Pollnac,
Crawford, & Gorospe, 2001).
3.2 Avoiding residual conservation
Residual conservation is now a well-recognized concern
with protected areas globally (Devillers et al., 2015; Ferraro
& Hanauer, 2011). We tested for the presence of system-
atic biases in the placement of SMAs and FHRs, compared
to open areas, by assessing whether they were located in
regions with a low value to resource users across four
metrics known to influence the configuration of protected
areas (Devillers et al., 2015).
The primary resource associated with Tonga’s SMA pro-
gram is the reef fish fishery (Parks, 2017).We therefore con-
verted all reef areas in Tonga into 100 m2 raster cells in
ArcMap (10.4.1) and labeled these as either SMA, FHR, or
Open based on their configuration as of October 2019. Four
socio-environmental variables were selected to test for sys-
tematic biases in the placement of SMAs and FHRs: dis-
tance to village, distance to land, long-term fishing pres-
sure, andwave energy. Details on how these variables were
calculated are available in the Supporting Information
(Section S3). The fishing pressuremetric represents a value
of relative long-term fishing effort throughout the region
calculated as the weighted abundance of commercial and
subsistence fishers from each village adjusted for differ-
ences in catch and extrapolated across available fishing
grounds with decay ratios determined from key informant
interviews. Fishing pressure insidemanagement areas rep-
resents fishing pressure prior to management. These four
variables, whichwere previously calculated for the entirety
of Tonga’s coral reef habitat, were chosen because they
are: (a) known to influence the configuration of protected
areas; and (b) are based on spatially continuous data across
the region. For the whole of Tonga, null models were cre-
ated of equal area to both total area of SMAs and total area
of FHRs, but randomly sampled from the total reef area in
Tonga (including SMAs and FHRs). These two null models
were resampled 1000 times and the difference for all four
metrics calculated between the actual SMA or FHR extent
and each null model. In addition, to determine whether
FHRs were systematically biased within SMAs, the same
method was applied but only to the total combined area
of FHRs and SMAs. One sample t-tests were then used to
determinewhether the bootstrapped differences varied sig-
nificantly from 0. All analysis was conducted in R (V.3.5.3)
(R core team, 2017).
With the exception of fishing pressure inside the SMAs,
both FHRs and SMAs were biased towards areas of
greater extractive value than expected by chance (Table 1,
Figure 4). Distance to village, distance to land, and wave
energy were all significantly lower within FHRs and SMAs
than null models. Fishing pressure was greater within
FHRs, but lower in SMAs. In addition, within SMAs, FHRs
TABLE 1 The relationship between four socio-environmental metrics and the presence of Fish Habitat Reserves and Special
Management Areas in Tonga. LCL and UCL represent 95% lower and upper confidence limits respectively from 1000 bootstrapped samples.
Negative estimate values indicate that values inside the management areas are lower than in areas open to fishing and positive estimate
values indicate that values inside the management areas are greater than in areas open to fishing
Fish Habitat Reserves
Variable Estimate LCL UCL t df p-Value
Distance to land −2048.59 −2055.93 −2041.25 −547.8 999 <.05
Distance to village −5353.65 −5366.11 −5341.2 −843.36 999 <.05
Fishing pressure 6.59 6.55 6.62 352.31 999 <.05
Wave Energy −855.94 −858.05 −853.84 −798.6 999 <.05
Special Management Areas
Variable Estimate LCL UCL t df p-Value
Distance to land −1627.38 −1630.25 −1624.51 −1111.6 999 <.05
Distance to village −4242.97 −4247.68 −4238.26 −1767.7 999 <.05
Fishing pressure −5.03 −5.05 −5.02 −809.19 999 <.05
Wave Energy −367.79 −368.52 −367.06 −988.86 999 <.05
Fish Habitat Reserves within Special Management Areas
Variable Estimate LCL UCL t df p-Value
Distance to land −365.01 −370.27 −359.75 −136.16 999 <.05
Distance to village −963.84 −972.53 −955.15 −217.67 999 <.05
Fishing pressure 11.07 11.04 11.09 846.45 999 <.05
Wave Energy −339.33 −340.71 −337.96 −484.21 999 <.05
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F IGURE 4 Density plots of overall differences in four socio-
environmental variables between no-take Fish Habitat Reserves
(FHR), Special Management Areas (SMA) and open areas in Tonga
were also more likely to be configured in areas of higher
fishing pressure, lower wave energy, and closer to villages
and land than the null model.
These results demonstrate that while Tonga’s SMA pro-
gram does have systematic biases in its configuration, they
are in the opposite direction to those commonly observed
for protected areas. Rather than being residual, manage-
ment areas in Tonga are systematically less likely to be
placed in areas of low extractive value than by chance. This
demonstrates that the SMAprogramhas been able to avoid
residual biases in protected area placement because no-
take FHRs must be situated only within the boundaries of
each SMA, and SMAs are implemented only near villages,
where resource use is historically high (Figure 3c).
4 LIMITATIONS OF THE PROGRAM
AND ITS EXPANSION TO OTHER
REGIONS
At the outset, while it is clear that the implementation of
Tonga’s SMA program has been successful with respect to
its rate of expansion, this does not demonstrate any dif-
ference made to the stated objectives of improving coastal
fisheries resources or biodiversity conservation.Ultimately
the success or failure of the SMA program is based on its
impact, or the difference it makes compared to taking no
action. However, determining impact relies on having an
accurate understanding not only of the present state, but
also counterfactual conditions that would be expected if
management had never occurred (Pressey, Visconti, & Fer-
raro, 2015).Whilemost SMA communities are enthusiastic
about the benefits of the program, there is little quantita-
tive evidence of any changes in ecosystem state and, ulti-
mately, coastal fisheries resources (Gillett, 2017). Several
studies conducted in 2010 on five SMAs began to examine
the impacts of the SMA program, with basic control-
impact methodology (Malimali, 2013; Richardson, 2010).
However, they were completed when most SMAs were
still too young for discernible changes to have occurred.
Webster et al. (2017) compared community-based catch
data with community perceptions of change in the oldest
SMA in Tonga, although theirmethodology did not test the
impacts of the FHR and used data of questionable quality.
While a large body of evidence supports the notion that the
no-take FHRs should provide positive impacts (Smallhorn-
West et al., 2019), given that fishing is still allowed
inside the SMAs, albeit potentially at a lower rate, it is
unreasonable to expect large changes in ecosystem state
within SMAs.
While acknowledging the caveats associated with pro-
tected area targets (Pressey et al., 2017), it should also be
noted that the present spatial coverage of no-take FHRs
in Tonga is low and unlikely to make significant contribu-
tions to national protected area commitments. Currently,
total FHR coverage is 45 km2, or 6.82 × 10−5 % of Tonga’s
EEZ, and 3.26 % of Tonga’s coral reef habitat. Further-
more, given widely reported problems with misreporting
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protected area targets in the South Pacific (e.g., Smallhorn-
West & Govan, 2018), SMAs could easily be mislabelled as
no-take protected areas and give the false impression that
Tonga is reaching its international commitments. Lastly,
the large coastal coverage by SMAs, where fishing is still
permitted, might also limit additional spatial planning and
no-take marine protected areas not associated with the
SMA program, or relegate them to areas far from popula-
tion centers and with less conservation impact.
The establishment of an SMA effectively sequesters the
tragedy of the commons at the village level, where ongoing
resource conflicts might continue to persist, albeit within
the community. However, in 2015 a project by MACBIO
gathered community members from existing SMAs to dis-
cuss “lessons learned” (Tupou Taufa et al., 2016). Two
key points raised were: (a) to “acknowledge that there
will always be community members who disagree; thus
communities should move forwards after adequate con-
sultation and majority agreement even if not 100% con-
sensus”; and (b) that “where possible, include dissenting
voices in the management of the SMAs”. Therefore, while
acknowledging that resource conflict might continue to
exist within communities, it is at a level that should allow
for better communication and collaboration between dis-
senting viewpoints. However, one caveat to this consider-
ation is that the dispersal scales of target species are likely
greater than the scale of individual management, result-
ing in a ‘partial commons’ (Almany et al., 2013; Costello,
Quérou, & Tomini, 2015). An additional caveat, and one
that requires further investigation, is the degree to which
gender and social status may limit the ability of certain
groups to contribute to decision-making without outside
interventions. Within this context, local management of
individual SMAs is meant to be supported by the Tongan
government through theMoF, although it is unclear at this
stage the degree to which marginalized groups are able to
have their voices heard, and this is a key area for further
research.
Lastly, it is important to note that the successful expan-
sion of the SMA program in Tonga has relied largely on the
fact that, prior to its inception, Tonga was entirely open
access. Re-establishing a form of customary tenure has
therefore been the prime incentive for strong engagement.
A key consideration in expanding this program to other
countries would be that support may be greatest in areas
where existing management is weakest. For example,
the SMA program in its current form might provide little
incentive for groups in Vanuatu to implement no-take
zones, where strong customary tenure already exists
(Govan, 2009). However, other incentives such as pro-
viding formal recognition of customary tenure through
legislation could provide similar enticements in these
places.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The dual approach of Tonga’s SMA program provides key
insights into mechanisms by which to avoid known pit-
falls in protected areas expansion. First, providing immedi-
ate incentives (e.g., exclusive access zones) that also foster
long-term relationships with resources encourages groups
that otherwise may be against management and conser-
vation to implement protected areas. Then ensuring that
protected areas occurwithin the boundaries of these exclu-
sive access zones entices groups to protect areas of greater
extractive value than they would likely do so otherwise.
Applying this framework successfully to other regions will
rely on understanding the specific local incentives that
will ultimately foster the greatest long-term engagement
in management and conservation.
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